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Most of macroeconomic theory presumes that the financial system  functions 
smoothly - and smoothly enough to  justify abstracting from  financial con- 
siderations.  This dictum applies to modern theory.  The currently popular real 
business cycle paradigm proceeds under the working hypothesis that financial 
structure is irrelevant.  To a first approximation, it also applies to the tradi- 
tional literature.  The main real/financial interaction in conventional Keynesian, 
Monetarist and Classical models stems from activity in the market for the medium 
of exchange, and not from the performance of  markets for borrowing and lending. 
Recently, interest has grown in exploring the possible links between the 
financial system and aggregate economic behavior.  This interest partly reflects 
the on-going beliefs of applied economists and policy-makers that financial 
markets and institutions deserve serious attention — that  they play important 
roles in the growth and fluctuation of  output.  (See Kaufman [l87] and Eckstein 
and Sinai  (1986),  for example.)  It also arises for two reasons connected to deve- 
lopments in academic work:  First, new empirical research, examining both histori- 
cal and post-war data, provides support for further pursuit of this topic; second, 
progress in  theory over the last decade has made it possible to address these 
kinds of  questions using the same degree of  rigor that is currently being applied 
elsewhere in macroeconomics. 
In this paper, I survey recent developments in the study of the 
real/financial interaction and try to  place a perspective on  where it currently 
stands.  Many of the ideas in this new literature have appeared earlier, though 
in less formal statements.  My  discussion thus includes earlier work as  well, 
beginning with the period of the Great Depression.  The survey  is in  two parts: 
The first reviews the traditional  literature and the second discusses new work. 
In part I,  I  argue that Depression—era economists believed that the behavior 
of the financial system was largely responsible for the extraordinary events of 2 
the time.  However, the Keynesian revolution supplanted further immediate research 
in this direction  while Keynes believed that financial elements were important, 
his direct disciples focused on other issues.  Moreover, they devoted attention 
to Keynes' liquidity preference theory which emphasized the importance of money, 
as opposed to credit.  Friedman and Schwartz's (1963]  empirical work provided 
further impetus  for viewing the money supply as the key financial aggregate. 
Part I  continues by  the discussing the counter-movement, lead by Gurley and 
Shaw and others, which stressed the significance of the financial system and, 
in particular, the importance of financial intermediation in the credit supply 
process.  The relevance for our purposes is that modern theories of the 
real/financial interaction  and of the role intermediaries play incorporate  many of 
the ideas in this literature.  The section also discusses the reasons  why this 
movement died down in the l970s.  A  major factor was the methodological revolution 
which stressed the importance of using first principles to construct macroeconomic 
frameworks; at the time, it was not feasible to use this approach to  study issues 
of  financial structure.  Another factor  was the increasing use of vector- 
autoregressions to study the money/output relation.  The statistical success of 
money in reduced form output equations helped rejuvenate the case for money as 
the central financial aggregate.  The section concludes by  discussing the 
empirical and theoretical  work that redirected interest toward  studying the 
relevance of  the rest of the financial system. 
Part II begins with recent literature that examines the real/financial 
interaction  at a general abstract level.  A common theme in this new work is 
that informational  asymmetries may introduce inefficiencies in financial 
markets which may have quantitatively significant consequences.  A number 
of  basic conclusions arise relevant to aggregate behavior:  First, the 3 
informational  problems typically reduce the level of  market activity and 
increase its  sensitivity to  disturbances such as changes in the riskless 
interest rate or  in productivity; second, financial contracts and institutions 
are determined simultaneously with real variables; third, financial variables 
such as balance sheet positions and cash flow affect individuals'  and firms' 
spending decisions, creating the analogue of income-accelerator  effects on 
demand.  The section continues by discussing some empirical work which bears on 
these various hypotheses. 
The current research on intermediation and banking is reviewed next.  This 
work is best understood in the context of the broader literature just mentioned; 
the common approach is to endogenously motivate intermediaries  as  optimal 
responses to the informational  problems which may disrupt financial markets, 
described in the more general literature.  In this vein, the main conclusion 
is that intermediaries  are important to aggregate activity.  It must be added 
that the models are somewhat abstract, but do  nonetheless  characterize basic 
features of intermediation  and banking.  (Banks  are distinguished from other 
intermediaries  by  their role in liquidity provision.)  However, while the 
literature offers considerable insights,  it is still well short of  providing 
precise policy advice.  The section discusses why policy recommendations vary 
dramatically among frameworks, and what issues  require further attention to 
resolve the debate. 
Finally, this section examines the work which has focused directly on  the 
role of financial factors in output fluctuations,  This research integrates 
advances in the literature on financial market inefficiencies and intermediation 
with recent advances in business cycle analysis.  While the work is still 
largely in a primitive form,  it does suggest rigorous  ways  to address some 
puzzles left currently unexplained by  existing models. 4 
A final  section offers some concluding remarks. 
Before beginning, let me  note that for tractability, I  am restricting 
attention to  papers which have a macroeconomic emphasis, at the expense of 
literature in finance which overlaps considerably in some areas. 
I.  The  Traditional Literature 
1.1  From Fisher and Keynes to  Friedman and Schwartz 
The idea that financial structure and output determination may be inter- 
related phenomena is not new.  It is easily traceable to the time of the Great 
Depression.  The collapse of  the financial system along with real  economic 
activity struck the attention of  economists contemporary to  the period.  It 
motivated Fisher (1933)  to argue (in the first volume of Econometrica) that 
the severity of the economic downturn resulted from poorly performing financial 
markets. 
What made the economy initially  so  vulnerable, in Fisher's view,  was the 
high leverage  of  the borrowing class in the wake of  the prosperity preceding 
1929.  In his words, "they (debts)  were great enough to not only 'rock the boat' 
but to start it capsizing".  The ensuing business downturn precipitated a wave 
of bankruptcies, enhancing the downturn.  Beyond this direct propagation  mecha- 
nism,  according to Fisher,  was an indirect  one which was probably of  greater 
empirical significance  because it involved  the entire borrowing class.  The 
deflation accompanying the slowdown redistributed  wealth from debtors to credi- 
tors.  This decline in net worth induced  borrowers to cut back on Current expen- 
ditures and future  commitments, sending the economy further down,  Continuing the 
spiral of  falling  output and deflation.  Fisher calculated that by March 1933, 
real  debt burdens increased  by  roughly 4O  due to the sharp decline in prices 
and incomes.  In his eyes, the fact that this massive deterioration in borrower 5 
balance sheets occurred simultaneously with the free fall  in output and prices 
lent credibility to the "debt-deflation"  story. 
Many others also perceived a link between the financial system and aggregate 
real activity.  Indeed, as Fisher noted in his article, ideas related to debt- 
deflation appeared in the works of Veblen  [1904),  Hawtrey [1926)  and others. 
The financial system did not have such an explicit central role in Keynes' 
theory of output determination.  It was,  however, an  integral part of  the broad 
picture.  Financial considerations played a part in the theory of  investment 
behavior characterized in the General Theory.  A key factor in the Keynesian 
investment story was the "state of  confidence".  As Minsky  [1975)  notes, Keynes 
was careful to distinguish two basic determinants of this state.  The first was 
borrowers beliefs about prospective  yields from investment projects.  The second 
was the "state of  credit", which Keynes argued  was governed by  the confidence 
that lenders  had in financing  borrowers.  Lenders'  confidence depended on  their 
perceptions of how well borrowers' incentives were aligned with their own and, 
relatedly, of how well secured  were borrower liabilities.  Keynes  concluded that 
a collapse in the confidence of either borrowers or lenders  was sufficient to 
induce  a downturn, but that a return to prosperity required that both be in good 
repair. 
The macroeconomics literature following the  General Theory largely ignored 
potential links between output behavior and the performance of credit markets. 
These papers (e.g.,  Hicks [1937),  Modigliani [l944fl did,  however, stress the 
indirect connection between financial markets and real  activity resulting from 
Keynes' liquidity preference theory.  By  doing so,  they shifted the emphasis to 
money as the financial variable most relevant to  aggregate economic behavior. 
The models in these papers demonstrated how the demand and supply for real money 
balances could determine the real  interest rate (presuming price stickiness, 6 
so that the interest  rate rather than the price level was the equilibrating 
force in the money market). 
Considerable  debate arose over the empirical significance  of the mechanism 
linking  money to real  activity.  Indeed the  early Keynesians  emphasized the 
importance of  "real factors" such as the multiplier/accelerator  mechanism and 
fiscal policy.  The monetarists,  with an  intellectual foundation tied closest to 
classical theory but nonetheless influenced by Keynesian thinking,  provided the 
main support for the importance  of  the monetary mechanism. 
The famous study by  Friedman and Schwartz [1963]  of the historical 
relationship  between money and output became the cornerstone for the 
monetarist case.  The money/output correlation was particularly transparent in 
the Great Depression.  From the start of the downturn in 1929 to the trough in 
1933,  the money supply declined Sharply along with output.  Thus, one important 
outcome of  Friedman and Schwartz' work was an alternative  explanation for the 
role of  financial markets in the Great Depression; the story emphasized the 
central importance of money and, as a consequence, deemphasized the significance 
of all other aspects of the financial system. 
Overall, the theory of liquidity preference and the time series work of 
Friedman and Schwartz provided motivation for the preoccupation  with money. 
The net effect was that the quantity of  the medium of exchange was the only 
financial aggregate to appear regularly in macroeconomic frameworks.  Further, 
commercial banks were the only financial institutions to receive any attention 
from macroeconomists,  and they obtained this distinction  only because a 
component of their liabilities  entered the money supply. 1.2  From Gurley and Shaw to Tobin 
Beginning with Gurley and Shaw [1955),  an attempt began to  redirect atten- 
tion toward the overafl interaction  between financial structure and real 
activity.  A  distinctive feature of the theory  Gurley and Shaw offered was an 
emphasis on financial intermediation,  and particularly on  the role of inter- 
mediaries in the credit supply process as opposed to the money supply process. 
The authors began by underscoring the following difference between 
developed and underdeveloped countries  In the former, and not in the latter, 
there typically exists a highly  organized and broad system of financial inter- 
mediation designed to  facilitate the flow of loanable funds between savers and 
investors.  (In fact, this correlation between economic development and 
financial sophistication has appeared regularly across time and across 
countries.  See Goldsmith [1969)  for an early and comprehensive study.)  The 
implication, Gurley and Shaw argued, was that the role intermediaries  play in 
improving the efficiency of iritertemporal  trade is an important factor 
governing general economic activity. 
A corollary argument was that restricting attention to the money supply 
mai it impossible to properly characterize the link between real and 
financial activity, and that this distortion worsens as the economy evolves 
financially.  In the early stages of financial development,  Gurley and Shaw 
noted,  commercial banking is typically the only major form of intermediation, so 
that most intermediaries  provide both transactions and lending services.  In 
this environment, the money stock might be a usefu' proxy for financial activity 
since the supply of inside  money - a major component of commercial bank liabili- 
ties — is closely related to the overall level of  financial intermediation. 
However, as the intermediary  system evolves, and lending institutions  with non— 
monetary liabilities  arise, the exclusive focus on  money becomes less  justified. 8 
The importance of money diminishes for two reasons  First,  the  money stock 
becomes a less exact measure of  the flow of  intermediary  credit; second, the 
liabilities of  the non-bank intermediaries provide an alternative  form for 
holding liquid  balances. 
In the simple Keynesian and Monetarist models, money could have important 
real  effects not only because prices were sticky, but importantly  also because 
the nominal money stock was fixed and therefore could not adjust  endogenously to 
changes in money demand.  Gurley and Shaw argued that the latter  assumption 
ignored the realities of modern financial markets; in such environments, even 
if the central bank can control the narrowly defined money stock, the supplies 
of close money substitutes may freely adjust to offset changes in money supply 
or demand. This movement mitigates the response  of interest  rates.  Thus, 
changes in the supply and demand for transactions  media may be  of minimal 
importance to aggregate activity in a financially sophisticated  economy, 
regardless of  whether prices are sticky.1  (Note that this argument does not 
suggest that monetary p01  icy is unimportant to real activity - it suggests 
only  that the principal channels of monetary policy may be different from the 
conventional one which stresses effects on the quantity of the medium of 
exchange.  See Section 11.2.) 
More relevant to macroeconomic behavior than the money stock, according to 
Gurley and Shaw,  was the economy's overall "financial capacity",  This was the 
measure of borrowers' ability to absorb debt,  without having to reduce either 
current spending or  future spending commitments (in order to avoid default or 
costly rescheduling).  In the Gurley/Shaw  world, financial capacity was an 
important determinant of aggregate demand.  The ramifications for business fluc- 
tuations reminded one of  the debt deflation theory.  The behavior of balance 
sheets - key determinants of  financial capacity - assumed an important role,  one which tended to  enhance movements in spending, and thus enhance the cycle. 
Intermediaries were relevant to  the mechanism because they extended 
borrowers  financial capacity.  By  helping overcome impediments to the flow of 
funds between savers and investors,  these institutions  made it feasible for cer- 
tain classes of  borrowers to obtain both greater quantities of credit and better 
credit terms than they could otherwise get from directly issuing securities to 
lenders.  To this extent, intermediaries  performed important services for the 
economy, services which the market did not perfectly duplicate elsewhere. 
(See Patinkin [1961]  for a related discussion of how intermediaries facilitate 
borrowing and lending.) 
The notion that financial considerations could be  relevant to macroeconomic 
behavior evolved through the literature.  For example;  Kuh and Meyer, [1963] 
and others presented evidence linking investment to balance sheet variables. 
Tobin and Qolde [1963]  stressed that capital market imperfections provided an 
avenue for reconciling the Keynesian and life-cycle theories of consumption; 
borrowing constraints could explain why current income  might have a more impor- 
tant role in consumption decisions than predicted by  the naive version of the 
life cycle model, which stressed the  importance  of the individuals  intertem— 
poral budget constraint.  Brainard and Tobin [1963] and others elaborated the 
financial sectors of macroeconomic models, and formally integrated some of  the 
ideas in Gurley and Shaw with existing theory.  Minsky [1975] and Kindleberger 
[1978]  described how crises in financial markets could severely disrupt real 
activity,  Finally, Tobin [1975]  argued that Fisher's debt—deflation theory  was 
a natural complement to the Keynesian theory  of income determination; it pro- 
vided a rationale for why expansionary policy may dominate deflation as  a way to 
restore  equilibrium output to its  full  capacity value. 1.3.  Consequences of the Modigliani-Miller Theorem, the Methodological Change 
in Macroeconomics, and Vector-Autorssion  Studies 
Shortly after Gurley and Shaw E1955]  emphasized the importance of the 
financial system, Modigliani and Miller {M/M)  tl9581  derived the formal  proposi- 
tion that real economic decisions were independent  of financial structure.  The 
proposition held for a setting of  perfect markets.  While Gurley and Shaw had in 
mind a different economic environment than the Arrow-Oebreu  world underlying 
the M/M theorem, they,  and others at the time,  did not have a formal counterpart 
to offer.  They accordingly could not provide arguments at the same level of 
rigor as those suggesting the unimportance  of  financial structure. 
Apart from its formal elegance, the MM theorem was attractive because it 
provided researchers  with a rigorous justification for abstracting From the 
complications induced by  financial considerations.  For example, the developers 
of neoclassical investment theory (,e.g. ,  Hail  and Jorgenson [1967])  took this 
approach.  They used the MM  theorem as  a convenient rationale for ignoring capi- 
tal market considerations when solving the firm's intertemporal investment 
choice problem.  For similar reasons, financial variables started disappearing 
from empirical investment  equations. 
The methodological revolution in macroeconomics in the 1970's also helped 
shift attention away From financial factors, in a less direct but probably more 
substantial way.  The resulting emphasis on  developing macroeconomic models 
explicitly from individual optimization posed an obstacle,  At the time, the 
only available and tractable model suitable For pursuing this methodological 
approach — the stochastic competitive equilibrium  growth model, developed by 
Brock and Mirman [1972)  and others — was essentially  an Arrow-Oebreu model, 
and thus had the property that financial structure was irrelevant. 11 
Modifying the Brock/Mirman framework - which  would eventually become the 
core for real  business cycle theory - to consider financial issues  was a for- 
midable task (and remains so  today).  Modeling imperfections in intertemporal 
trade obviously requires having an  environment  where there exists motivation for 
trade; this necessitates introducing heterogeneity among agents, which is 
difficult to accomplish in a way which is both interesting  and tractable.  The 
representative agent formulation  used in the competitive growth models -  and 
subsequently  in  real  business  cycle  theory  -  effectively  abstracts from trade, 
or more precisely, abstracts from any possible complications in the trading pro- 
cess, 
In addition, abiding strictly by  the rules of the game requires endogenously 
deriving the financial system — after all, financial institutions and financial 
contracts are ultimately endogenous variables and,  except in the frictionless 
environment for which the MM theorem is relevant, determined jointly with real 
activity.  At the time, however, the theoretical techniques required for 
accomplishing this task and others related were not adequately developed, or 
perhaps more accurately,  not widely understood by  macroeconomjsts. 
Empirical considerations also affected the course of research.  The 
widespread use of vector autoregressions to analyze macroeconomic time series 
shifted the focus back to money as the key financial aggregate.  Led by  Sims 
[1972],  researchers  paid considerable attention to the reduced form bivariate 
model of money and output.  The common result they obtained was that lagged 
values of  money were important for forecasting  variation in output.  (This 
general statistical  pattern appears to remain true today,  though it is 
sensitive to the form of the estimated equations - see  Eichenbaum and Singleton 
(19861.)  While this reduced form evidence did not have any unambiguous struc- 
tural interpretation, it nonetheless provided motivation for developing models 12 
of output fluctuations where money was an important driving variable, in a true 
causal sense. 
Even the classical/rational expectations macro—models of  the 70's - the 
forerunners of real  business cycle models - focused  on  the money-output 
correlation, and tried to  explain this relationship  by formulating  a true 
causal role for money.  The monetary transmission mechanism they  emphasized, 
however, differed substantially from the earlier Keynesian and Monetarist 
theories:  Only unanticipated movements in the money supply mattered, and did so 
by creating misperceptions about movements in nominal versus relative prices. 
This conclusion sparked a controversy about the monetary transmission  mechanism 
which moved quickly to  the center stage in macroeconomics, and which remains 
there today in an updated form,  )See Blanchard (1987)  for a review.)  Signifi- 
cantly for our purposes, in all  the debate  over this issue,  the implicit common 
view was that any important real/financial interaction involved the  market for 
the medium of  exchange.  The rest of the financial system was largely ignored. 
1.4.  Revival of Interest 
New empirical work and new developments in theory rekindled interest 
in studying financial aspects of  the business cycle.  The empirical work 
involved a reconsideration of  two earlier  issues:  first, the role of  financial 
factors in the Great Depression and, second, the significance of  the post-war 
time series relationship between money and output.  On  the theoretical  side, 
techniques useful for formalizing financial market problems became available due 
to progress in the economics of information  and incentives. 
The new empirical literature began with Mishkin (1978], who analyzed data 
from the Great Depression to determine whether financial factors affected 
consumer spending.  Mishkin studied the interaction  between output, consumer 13 
balance sheets, and consumer spending.  He found that the behavior of household 
net financial positions in fact had a significant influence on consumer demand. 
Further, the results provided evidence for a financial aspect to the business 
cycle propagation  mechanism, reminiscent of the one present in Fisher's debt- 
deflation theory.  Specifically, Mishkin found that the rise in consumer real 
indebtedness  resulting from declining incomes and deflation induced consumers to 
lower spending on durables and housing, which in turn magnified the decline. 
In an influential  paper, Bernanke {1983) analyzed the relative importance of 
monetary versus financial factors in the Great Depression.  His central conclu- 
sion was that  the collapse of  the financial system was an important determinant 
of the depression's depth and persistence — and  that monetary forces alone were 
"quantitatively insufficient"  to explain these phenomena.  The paper chronicled 
the breakdown of credit  markets over the period 1930-33.  It detailed both the 
crisis in banking - nearly  half the banks failed over the period and many  of  the 
surviving ones suffered major losses -  and  the  crisis  in security markets - the 
ratio of  debt service to national income  more than doubled in 1932-33. 
Reasoning as Gurley and Shaw might have, Bernanke argued that the breakdown in 
banking affected real activity by choking off financial flows to  certain sectors 
of the economy, sectors consisting of borrowers who did not have easy access to 
non—intermediated forms of  credit,  And there was more  The precipitous wor- 
sening of balance sheets resulting from the jump in debt service — the "debt 
crisis" -  shrank  borrowers' collateral, greatly reducing their ability to obtain 
funds on the open market.  Overall, as Bernanke stressed, the principal arteries 
facilitating capital flows were  severely eroded. 
The alternative  hypothesis, due to Friedman and Schwartz, was that the 
decline in bank liabilities (money)  was the main disrupting factor resulting 
from the banking/financial  crisis, and not the associated decline in bank assets 14 
or  other forms of credit.  To test the competing propositions,  Bernanke esti- 
mated Barro's (1978]  model of unanticipated money and output,  modified to 
include proxies for financial distress.  He  found that the financial variables — 
(i)  liabilities  of failed banks and businesses and (ii)  spreads between risky 
and safe bond rates — added considerable explanatory power to the output 
equations.  He  argued further that the informal  evidence suggested that these 
financial variables were not simply responding to  anticipations  of future output 
decline; consequently, it was consistent with the evidence to conclude that the 
disruption of credit markets was important to the collapse in real activity. 
(See Hamilton (1987) for further evidence supporting this view and Haubrich 
[1987]  for a parallel study of financial factors in the Canadian Depression.) 
A number of  studies, beginning with Sims [1980]  and Litterman and Weiss 
(1985]  reexamined the post-war time series interactions  between money and out- 
put, and presented evidence which questioned the interpretation that money was 
an important driving force.  While there remains no  consensus view on  how the 
results bear on importance of money (see e.g., McCallum [1983]),  useful lessons 
did arise.  It became widely appreciated that making definitive inferences about 
causation from reduced form time series correlations was generally difficult, if 
not impossible.  It accordingly  became unacceptable to justify a preoccupation 
with money simply by appealing to its ability to forecast  well in reduced form 
output equations.  (Tobin  [1970], of course, argued this point much earlier.) 
Another effect of  this empirical literature was to motivate the need to con- 
sider alternatives to the simple  Keynesian and Monetarist stories of the real/ 
financial interaction,  In this capacity, some interesting  factors  emerged. 
King and Plosser [1984]  found that inside  money had significantly more explana- 
tory power for output than did the monetary base.  (See also Lacker [1987].) 
This suggested the possibility that much of the covariation  between money and 15 
output was due to the money supply adjusting endogenously to  movements in  money 
demand.  An implication of  this possibility was that the statistical success of 
money in vector auto-regressions  may have resulted from its strong endogenous 
component 
A series of  papers by Friedman [1980], [1982]  developed another set of 
relevant facts.  The papers compared the performance of money versus debt in 
reduced form output equations, and concluded that the ratio of debt to output 
was considerably more stable than the ratio of money to output.  Of  course, this 
evidence alone did not yield sharp conclusions about the roles of money versus 
credit.  tt was, however, at least consistent with a Gurley/Shaw interpretation; 
the existence of  money substitutes  could explain the instability in monetary 
velocity, while the importance of credit flows could underlie the stable connec- 
tion between debt and output. 
At  the same time,  developments in the economics of information  and incen- 
tives facilitated  making theoretical progress on  these types of  issues.  A 
basic theme of the new work in information  economics was that inefficiencies 
in trade could arise when either of the parties involved had an  informational 
advantage; in addition, contracts - or possibly other types of institutional 
devices such as screening or monitoring -  may  be  desirable to  structure 
incentives in a  way which minimizes these inefficiencies.2  The formal 
apparatus devised to analyze trade under imperfect information  extended 
naturally to the study of  financial markets.  Indeed, beginning with Jensen 
and Meckling [1976],  Leland  and Pyle [1977]  and others, the finance literature 
quickly used this methodology to develop theories of  capital Structure and 
intermediation.  Only in recent years has the approach been widely applied in 
the macroeconomics literature. XI.  Current Literature 
I will divide the discussion of  current research into three sections. 
It is useful to begin with the literature that examines the allocative con- 
sequences informational  asymmetries in financial markets at  the micro-level. 
This is so because much of the new theory on the real/financial interaction 
at  the aggregate level  rests on insights  that emanate from these papers. 
A  discussion of intermediation  will follow naturally, since the new develop- 
ments in this area center on attempts to explain intermediaries  as optimal 
institutional responses to  financial market inefficiencies.  A final section 
will review the literature that focuses directly on macroeconomic behavior. 
11,1  Ailocative Effects of Informational Problems in Financial Markets 
Many  of  the ideas this literature  can be best understood in the context 
Akerlaf's tlg6g]  paper on the "lemons" problem.  The paper illustrates how asym- 
metric information  between buyers and sellers about product quality can cause a 
market to malfunction.  The argument runs as follows  Since the market price 
reflects buyers' perceptions of the average quality of the product being sold, 
sellers of low quality  goods (lemons)  will receive  a premium at the expense of 
those selling high quality goods.  This distortion in turn will affect the level 
of  market activity; some high quality sellers will stay Out of  the market, and 
possibly enough to preclude the market from opening. 
The literature on financial market inefficiencies  applies Akerlof's basic 
idea  that lemons  problems may distort economic behavior.  An early example  is 
Jaffee and Russell [1976],  which explains how unobserved differences in borrower 
quality can induce credit rationing.  The paper constructs a setting  where 
borrower default probabilities increase with loan size.  Further, for any given 
loan size, default probabilities  differ across borrowers due to factors lenders 
cannot observe.  Since borrowers are indistinguishable  cx  ante, the market 17 
interest  rate incorporates  a "lemons" premium.  Consequently, good quality 
borrowers (those  with low  default probabilities) suffer at  the expense of  bad 
quality borrowers.  Credit rationing in the form of restrictions  on  loan size 
can emerge for the following reason:  Good borrowers may prefer the restrictions 
because the smaller loan sizes may lower the market average default probability, 
reducing the lemons premium  bad borrowers have to follow along in order not to 
reveal themselves.3 
In a very influential  paper, Stiglitz and Weiss [19811  exploit informational 
asymmetries to  motivate a form of credit rationing where the market denies funds 
to borrowers with characteristics identical to those receiving loans.  The key 
unobserved factor is the riskiness of borrowers' projects.  It is also assumed 
that borrowers issue standard risky debt which pays lenders  a fixed interest 
rate if the project yield is sufficiently high, and pays the net yield other- 
wise.  Thus, for a given loan rate,  lenders earn a lower expected return on 
loans to  bad quality borrowers (those  with riskier projects) than to good.  This 
occurs because an  unobserved mean preserving spread in a borrower's project 
return  distribution reduces the expected payment to lenders under default. 
(Lenders  receive no offsetting compensation in the non-default state,  since the 
loan rate is unchanged.) 
Stiglitz and Weiss show that, given their assumptions, the loan supply 
curve may bend backwards and that credit rationing can emerge us a consequence. 
Essentially, the lemons principle is at work.  A rise in the interest rate 
lowers the average borrower quality, as those with relatively safe projects are 
the first to drop out.  Thus, after a point, further increases in the interest 
rate may lower lenders' expected return, making the loan supply  curve bend back- 
wards.  Rationing arises - where some borrowers are arbitrarily  denied credit — 
when the loan demand and supply  curves do not intersect.4  The quantity of loans 18 
offered is the maximum the supply curve permits.  The excess demand for loans 
persists because adjustments in the interest rate cannot equilibrate the market; 
further increases in the interest rate only lower the supply of loans offered. 
Many  papers  elaborate on the theme initiated  by  Jaffee/Russell and 
Stiglitz/Weiss.5  The results often depend greatly on the particular infor- 
mational asymmetries posed between borrowers and lenders.  Nonetheless, two 
basic conclusions  usually emerge: First, the postulated incentive problems 
distort the market equilibrium, most often toward  underlending; second, they 
make the equilibrium quantity of lending more sensitive than otherwise to  exoge- 
nous disturbances.  A recent example is Mankiw (19861  who analyzes a credit 
market plagued by  lemons  problems and shows how a small rise in the riskless 
interest rate can lead  to a large reduction in lending,  possibly even a 
collapse.  The result occurs because the increase in the riskiess rate forces up 
the loan rate,  which reduces the average quality of borrowers as in Stiglitz 
and Weiss.  This in turn forces the loan rate up further to  offset the lemons 
effect.  If the lemons  problem  is severe  enough, the market will collapse. 
A notable distinction of Mankiw's results is that they do  not hinge on  the 
existence of credit rationing, narrowly defined.  There are no loan ceilings for 
individual borrowers (since  all project sizes are fixed).  Also, identical 
borrower types receive identical treatment, in contrast to Stiglitz and Weiss. 
It is true,  however, that market forces exclude a number of  borrowers who would 
otherwise obtain loans in the absence of  informational  problems.  The important 
point is that the basic insights from this literature need not be  tied to par- 
ticular forms of credit rationing. 
Another strand of  this literature emphasizes that lemons  problems may affect 
equity markets as well as  debt markets.  Myers and Majluf (19841  and Greenwald, 
Stiglitz and Weiss [1984) discuss how asymmetric information about the value of 19 
a firm's existing assets can restrict its ability to issue new shares.  Outside 
lenders  must discern whether the share issue is a legitimate effort to either 
obtain new financing or diversify risk,  or is instead simply an attempt to pass 
off bad assets.  This problem may lower the price the firm can obtain for its 
equity, and in extreme cases, make it prohibitive to issue new shares.  Evidence 
for this phenomena, according to  Greenwald, Stiglitz and Weiss, is that a firm's 
announcement of a new issue typically leads to a significant decline in its 
market value.  The authors also emphasize the analogy between "equity rationing" 
and credit rationing more generally.  As is true for the latter,  the former may 
affect a firm's real  investment decisions by  constraining its ability to raise 
external funds or to  suitably diversify risk. 
Particular results in literature discussed thus far are sometimes highly 
sensitive to exogenous restrictions  made on  the forms of the relevant financial 
contracts.  For example, in some models, allowing borrowers to  issue a richer 
menu of liabilities  than the simple risky debt contract described earlier can 
eliminate the incentive  problems.  (See DeMeza and Webb t19871  for an illustra- 
tion of this point.)  This is troublesome, since real  world financial arrange- 
ments are largely  endogenous outcomes.  Even introducing  empirically motivated 
restrictions on contract forms is worrisome, given the rapid pace of financial 
innovation;  what is true in financial markets today need not be  true tomorrow. 
These problems have stimulated a recent literature  which attempts to explore the 
effects of financial markets inefficiencies without  making a priori assumptions 
about financial structure. 
Under this new approach the real/financial interaction is a purely endoge- 
nous outcome, which arises explicitly from assumptions about the information 
structure, and other primitive factors, such as preferences and technology.  An 
important early paper is Townsend [1979],  which derives circumstances  where 20 
standard risky debt contracts say be optimal.  He  considers the problem of a 
lender and borrower interested in formulating  a bilterel loan agreement.  Two 
key premises are, first, that the lender  must pay a fixed cost to observe the 
returns to the borrower's project 
-  in  Townsend's terminology there is "costly 
state verfication" - and,  second that the borrower does not have sufficient colla- 
teral to fully secure the loan.  The dilemma the lender faces is that the 
borrower who is unmonitored has the incentive  to misreport the project out- 
come, but that it is inefficient  to commit to auditing the borrower under all 
circumstances. 
Townsend formally proves that the optimal contract has the following 
features: It specifies a "no-default" yield r.  IF the project yield is suf- 
ficiently high, the lender receives r and does not audit.  If not,  the borrower 
declares "default" and the lender  monitors.  Thus,  the efficient contract is 
debt with possible costly default.6  While the analysis does not provide a 
complete description of bankruptcy, it does offer a very tractable and explicit 
way to illustrate how incentive problems can add real Costs to the lending pro- 
cess. 
Several recent papers have used the costly  state verification framework to 
study how financial considerations may have allocative consequences.  Gale and 
Heliwig t1985]  analyze the interaction  between the real and financial  decisions 
of a firm which must  borrow to finance  factor inputs.  In  analogy to Townsend, 
lenders Cannot  costlessly observe the firm's  output.  Gale and Heliwig show how 
this informational  problem ultimately constrains the firm's input demand.  Input 
investment is lower than otherwise because the marginal cost of funds includes 
the change in expected default costs; the optimal financial contract compensates 
lenders for the greater probability of default resulting from a rise in 
(leveraged) input demand. 21 
Williamson  [19871  analyzes a related problem in a  market context, and 
demonstrates how it is possible to explain the type of  credit rationing charac- 
terized by  Stiglitz and Weiss, without a priori restrictions  on financial 
contracts.  Rationing may occur because the expected default costs stemming from 
costly state verification may make it prohibitively expensive for borrowers to 
obtain funds from lenders  with high opportunity costs.  (Borrowers are identical 
cx ante, but lenders  vary according to their opportunity costs of funds).  As 
with Gale and Heliwig, the allocative effects arise because the informational 
problems effectively increase the marginal cost of funds. 
There are of course good reasons for not taking the costly state verifica- 
tion model as literal  description of many lending  situations.  There exist many 
circumstances where auditing and other default costs are insubstantial and where 
borrowers issue liabilities  other than standard risky debt contracts.  However, 
similar types of qualitative conclusions regarding the link between infor- 
mational asymmetries, the joint determination of real and financial variables, 
and the inefficiency  of the investment  process emerge in settings with richer 
descriptive features. 
For example, Bernanke and Gertler [1987bJ  examine the endogenous interaction 
between financial structure and real  activity in a market with a general type of 
lemons  problem present.  In their setting, entrepreneurs (or,  possibly cor- 
porate managers) evaluate potential investment projects and proceed with those 
which are profitable to them.  Because of insufficient  resources, they must 
obtain at least some outside funding.  Importantly,  however, the information 
they obtain about project quality (i.e.,  the project's success probability) is 
private knowledge to  them.  This provides entrepreneurs with too strong an 
incentive to proceed with the project they have initiated, since they can pass 
off to lenders  poor quality projects as good quality ones, 22 
The optimal financial contract accounts for the lemons problem by struc- 
turing the payoffs in a way to discourage this activity.  Because it is not 
possible to completely eliminate the problem — see  the paper for the details — 
the cost of capital entrepreneurs face incorporates  a lemons  premium.  In ana- 
logy to  the earlier literature (with exogenous contract forms), this 
lemons-induced rise in borrowing costs reduces the efficiency of  the investment 
process and in severe cases may induce  an investment collapse.  An implication 
is that informational distortions can in theory  have quantitatively significant 
effects on investment  behavior.  In addition, the conclusions extend beyond 
situations where simple debt contracts are the exclusive financial instruments. 
The optimal contracts which emerge in the analysis are general state-contingent 
contracts, which have a variety of institutional  representations e.g., com- 
binations of debt and equity, intermediary  credit lines). 
As  with the previous literature,  conclusions from this recent work are often 
sensitive to the postulated incentive problem.  The question arises,  What types 
of general testable predictions  can these models make, particularly ones rele- 
vant to aggregate behavior?  Bernanke and Gertler [1986)  argue that for a wide 
class of  environments the following proposition  holds, The market equilibrium 
level  of investment depends positively on borrower balance sheet positions, 
defined as the ratio of net worth to liabilities.  In this regard,  there is a 
strong connection between the conclusions  of thim new literature and the ideas 
which arose much earlier from the informal  discussions of Fisher, Gurley and 
Shaw and others. 
The argument proceeds roughly as follows: A strengthened balance sheet 
implies a borrower has more resources available to either use directly for pro— 
ject finance  or  as collateral in obtaining outside funds.  This reduces the 
borrower's cost of obtaining external funds by  lowering the informational  risk 23 
that outside lenders face, and in turn stimulates investment.  Examples of this 
theoretical  link between balance sheets and investment  appear in Bernanke and 
Gertler (1986],  [1987bJ and Calomaris and Hubbard [19871.  The two former papers 
emphasize the cyclical interaction  of these two variables and how a financially— 
induced investment collapse is possible.  The latter uses the Stiglitz/Weiss 
model to illustrate how borrower balance sheet positions affect the degree of 
credit rationing.  In the end,  one may view these analyses as attempts at formal 
underpinnings for the Gurley/Shaw notion that "financial capacity" matters to 
private spending. 
An equivalent prediction of  these papers is that borrower investment deci- 
sions will be  excessively sensitive" to  Current Cash flow,  that is,  more san— 
stive than they would be absent capital market problems.  In a setting of 
perfect markets, cash flow and investment  may be positively correlated because 
movements in the former may signal movements in the firm's future earnings 
potential.  With capital market imperfections  there is an  additional effect 
A rise (fall)  in cash flow strengthens (weakens)  the firm's  balance sheet and 
thus lowers (increases)  its cost of capital.  In this vein, it is possible to 
rationalize income-accelerator  effects on  investment.  (By making a related 
appeal to capital market imperfections, one can also explain why consumption 
spending may be  excessively sensitive to  current income.  See, for example, 
Scheinkman and Weiss [1985]  for a theoretical analysis and Zeldes [1985]  for an 
empirical treatment.) 
Another prediction relevant to  the empirical implementation of these ilels 
is that new borrowers will face tighter financial constraints than those 
long and reasonably successful track records, everything else equal.  In a fric- 
tionless  environment, for example, young firms and mature firms should be  able 
to  obtain funds equally well at risk corrected interest rates.  The same need 24 
not be  true when  informational asymmetries  are relevant, for several reasons. 
First,  lenders  will generally know more about mature firms, since  they will have 
had some time and experience to learn  about relevant characteristics.  Second, 
mature firms may credibly enter repeated relationships with lenders,  the signi- 
ficance being that long term relationships  help mitigate informational  problems. 
The reasons for this is that multi-period  contracts permit more flexibility in 
structuring incentives to curb against deviant behavior,  For example, Stiglitz 
and Weiss  £1983)  provide an example of  how lenders  may use the threat to  cut off 
credit in the future to  improve the current behavior of  borrowers. 
A final testable implication is, ceteris paribus, that financial constraints 
are likely to have more impact on  the real  decisions of individual  borrowers and 
small firms than on large firms.  First, the class of large firms consists pri- 
marily of mature firms who have the advantages described above.  Second, there 
may be an  informational economy of scale in lending to large firms, to the 
extent that lenders may face fixed costs of  gathering certain types of  critical 
data about borrowers. 
In a very interesting  and ambitious  paper, Fazzari, Hubbard and Peterson 
(1987)  find empirical support for these various propositions.  Using Value Line 
data, they conduct a time series and cross-sectional analysis of a broad class 
of  firms.  The main result is that,  overall, investment is significantly more 
sensitive to current cash flow than a frictionless  neoclassical model would pre- 
dict.  Further, the conclusions are most dramatic for new firms and small firms. 
The authors buttress their arguments by  reporting evidence from a case study 
of corporate financing behavior over the period 1960-1980, by Srini Vasan 
(1986].  The study shows that small to  medium size manufacturing firms — which 
account for roughly a  quarter of all manufacturing assets — relied  heavily on 
internal  funds; they used this source to finance eighty five percent of their 25 
new investments.  (In addition, see Calomaris, Hubbard and Stock [1987]  for an 
empirical analysis of  how credit market problems afflict the agricultural sector 
and Chirinko [1987)  for a recent econometric study of  liquidity effects on 
investment.) 
11.2  Models of Financial Intermediation 
Current research on  the macroeconomic implications  of financial inter- 
mediation incorporates  many of earlier ideas of Gurley and Shaw and others. 
It stresses the role of these institutions in overcoming imperfections in 
markets which transfer funds between savers and investors.  Differences with the 
traditional literature largely reflect advances in methodology.  The new work 
applies first principles to explain the existence and structure of inter- 
mediaries, and to describe how these institutions  may interact with aggregate 
real activity. 
Because the objective is so ambitious, this new literature is still at an 
early stage.  While the models developed thus far capture basic features of 
intermediation, they are still not rich in detail.  Whether it is necessary to 
enhance certain descriptive aspects of  these models  before arriving at substan- 
tive behavioral and policy conclusions is an important  and open question. 
As  a prelude to further  discussion,  it is interesting to  compare two papers 
on intermediation by Fama, spaced five years apart.  The first, Fama [1980), 
characterizes the role of intermediaries, taking the frictionless competitive 
'iarkets model as a working hypothesis.  The paper describes how,  in this 
environment, banks and other financial institutions  are simply veils over real 
economic behavior.  This follows since the Modigliani-Miller theorem applies in 
this setting, and hence financial structure — including  the structure of inter- 
mediation — is  both indeterminate and irrelevant. 26 
The second, Fama [1985], takes Sr  alternative route and considers why inter- 
mediaries might indeed  play an important role in the economy, particularly com- 
mercial banks.  The starting point is the casual observation that borrowers who 
obtain bank loans typically pay a higher return than the market rate on directly 
placed securities of similar  maturity.  The inference  drawn is that,  for certain 
classes of  borrowers, bank credit is "special" - open market  credit  is not 
available as a perfect substitute.  Fama then argues that this feature of bank 
lending arises, because of the  comparative advantage banks develop in gathering 
information  about borrowers.  This advantage implies that intermediation  -is 
often not simply a veil, and is instead  for many situations the most efficient 
way to minimize the types of informational  distortions described in the previous 
section. 
Diamond [1984] provides an early example of how it -is  possible to formally 
explain intermediary-like institutions.  He  considers a setting with an infor- 
mation structure similar to the one in Townsend's costly state verification 
model: Lenders cannot freely  observe the returns to borrowers' projects.  As 
with Townsend, the optimal bilateral financial arrangement is a risky debt 
contract, under which the lender  monitors the borrower in the event of default. 
An important difference from Townsend is that project sizes and endowment pat- 
terns are fixed so  that borrowers need to  obtain funds from many individuals. 
Diamond then proves that, in order to economize on monitoring costs, it is 
optimal for a  competitive financial institution to channel funds between savers 
and borrowers.  Further, the structure of this institution - which  arises endo- 
genously - shares basic features of a conventional intermediary.  This institu- 
tion: (i) writes  loan contracts with individual  borrowers and monitors borrowers 
who default; (ii)  holds a heavily diversified portfolio; (iii)  transforms assets 
for savers  in particular, the individual liabilities  which the institution 27 
issues to savers have smoother payoff patterns than the individual securities 
they obtain from borrowers. 
Diamond shows that the latter two characteristics arise to  solve a potential 
incentive problem between the financial institution  and its depositors.  To 
avoid duplication of  monitoring costs, it is clearly efficient for the institu- 
tion to perform as a  delegated monitor" of borrowers, on behalf of the  deposi- 
tors.  But the following issue arises: How do the depositors monitor the 
monitor?  Diamond's argument is that the institution  can circumvent this problem 
by  holding a heavily  diversified portfolio.  Diversification eliminates the need 
for depositors to audit the intermediary, because it permits the intermediary  to 
credibly offer savers a return  which is unaffected by any of  the independent 
risks that  borrowers face. 
A number of papers have followed Diamond's path to study the link  between 
intermediation  and real  activity.  For example, Williamson [1986]  uses a similar 
environment to illustrate how intermediation and credit rationing may be 
interrelated phenomena.  Rationing emerges in his framework because costly state 
verification adds a premium to loan rates (see the previous section); inter- 
mediation arises simultaneously  as  way to minimize this premium 
—  and  thus 
minimize  rationing 
—  by economizing on  monitoring Costs, in analogy to Diamond's 
argument. 
Boyd and Prescott [1986)  stress the role intermediaries play in evaluating 
loan projects cx  ante and,  relatedly, in minimizing the types of lemons problems 
described in the earlier section.  They  consider an environment where each 
individual is endowed with both a limited  amount of wealth and a project.  The 
latter is either of good or bad quality, and its type is the individual's  pri- 
vate information.  Endogenous intermediary coalitions emerge, and these coali- 
tions structure incentives so  that those with bad quality projects become savers 28 
while those with good quality ones seek funding.  The devices that these inter- 
mediaries use are project evaluations  and financial contract structure. 
Further, diversification is desirable because it allows the intermediary to 
implement the optimal incentive scheme  with certainty.7 
Other papers have attempted to enrich the description of intermediation that 
these types of frameworks offer.  Moore [1987]  emphasizes that intermediaries, 
particularly commercial banks, often enter repeated relationships with lenders. 
He  Constructs an  environment  where multi-period loan contracts help mitigate 
informational  distortions (see the previous section).  He  then shows that inter- 
mediaries help maximize the efficiency gains from long term relationships by 
matching large quantities of lenders  and borrowers, and thus diversifying the 
risk that individual lenders  or  borrowers may disrupt multi-period arrangements 
by  having to suddenly leave the market (e.g.,  to meet liquidity needs). 
Morgan [1987]  considers another prevalent phenomenon, namely that most com- 
mercial bank loans are made under loan commitment agreements, as opposed to 
being negotiated on  the spot.  Further these agreements typically do not specify 
fixed loan quantities in advance, only ceiling levels instead.  Morgan first 
adds uncertainty about project costs to the basic costly state verification 
model.  This uncertainty about funding  needs makes borrowers face the risk of 
being rationed by lenders,  since default probabilities and thus expected default 
costs vary positively with loan size.  Morgan then shows how in the competitive 
equilibrium intermediaries will offer borrowers contracts which have the basic 
features of loan commitments.  These contracts arise to provide borrowers with 
partial insurance against the rationing risk.  (See  also Veitch [1986]  and 
Greenbaum et. al  [1987]  for related approaches). 
One striking feature  of  the behavioral theories presented thus far is that 
intermediation  works extremely well, so  well that — taking  the models literally — 29 
a laissez—faire  policy toward financial intermediaries is optimal.  This conclu- 
sion, however, is at odds with the position taken by  policy-makers since the 
Depression that the smooth functioning of intermediation, and of  commercial 
banking particular, requires some form of regulation. 
One possiblity, of course, is that these policy  makers simply have been 
wrong, and that any problems with financial intermediation instead  stem from 
unwise government policy.  Gorton and Haubrich (19863  adopt this view, and 
present a formal analysis of how regulations  which restrict the ability  of 
intermediaries to  diversify or to  write contracts - such  as the Glass/Steagall 
Act — can introduce inefficiencies  that might not otherwise exist.8 
An  alternative possibility is that there exist natural factors which can 
disrupt the intermediation process, not captured in the basic frameworks of 
Diamond and others.9  A leading  candidate for concern is a liquidity crisis. 
Indeed, traditional arguments for intervention (see e.g.,  Friedman and Schwartz 
[1986])  cite  the need to protect financial institutions  exposed to liquidity 
risk. 
Diamond and ilybvig [1983]  explore the idea that liquidity considerations may 
justify the types of interventions in commercial banking which are currently in 
effect, such as  federal deposit insurance.  They begin with a framework which 
emphasizes the iu,purtance  of banks in the provision of liquidity.  In their 
setting, individuals  face uncertain liquidity needs.  Further, these needs are 
not publicly observable and therefore not directly insurable.  The incomplete- 
ness in  markets for liquidity insurance  creates a role for banks.  These 
institutions  are able to provide this insurance by offering individuals  deposits 
which give them flexibility over the timing of withdrawal. 
The story is not over, however,  since the portfolios of  these institutions 
are potentially subject to liquidity risk.  6ecause the banks issue liabilities 30 
requiring payment on demand, circumstances  say arise where they cannot honor the 
claims of  all those who decide to  withdraw.  Diamond and Dybvig demonstrate that 
as  a result 'sunspot" panics  can arise; depositors may withdraw simply in anti- 
cipation of others withdrawing, making the prophecy self-fulfilling.  Further, 
the panic disrupts real activity to the extent that it forces banks to liquidate 
productive loan projects.  Diamond and Oybvig conclude that there is a strong 
justification for policies such as deposit insurance  which prevent costly 
liquidity crises by eliminating the incentive for depositors to panic.10 
The Diamond/Oybvig paper has stimulated a lengthy debate in the literature. 
At issue is whether private financial institutions, if left to their own devi- 
ces,  can make the types of arrangements necessary to  avoid problems like 
liquidity  panics.  ,Jacklin  (1985]  and others, for example, demonstrate that the 
bank run equilibrium in the Diamond/Dybivg model arises because of exogenous 
restribtions  on  deposit contracts that banks can offer savers.  The critical 
assumption is the "sequential  service constraint"  which requires that banks 
honor deposit  withdrawals at face  value until they no longer  have funds.  This 
makes depositors'  payoffs depend critically on their respective places in line, 
which makes a panic possible.  A bank could -  in  theory — avert  a panic by 
eliminating the sequential service constraint and instead offering contracts 
with equity-like features; in particular, by  making deposit returns contingent 
on the total number of withdrawals, the bank could eliminate the depositors' 
incentive to run. 
Resolving this debate is difficult.  While in the context of these types of 
models there typically exist private contractual  arrangements which eliminate 
the need for any government intervention,  these types of  arrangements are 
often not observed in practice, as Diamond and Dybvig argue.  (See Gorton (1985] 
for an opposing position).  Whether this is because the current regulatory 31 
environment either precludes these arrangements or  makes them unnecessary, or is 
instead  because the existing models of intermediary  behavior are still 
incomplete is an issue that requires further attention. 
In an interesting  paper, Bhattacharya and Gale [19871  make a case for 
government intervention to insure the smooth flow of liquidity,  without 
appealing to arbitrary restrictions  on  private contracts.  In their framework, 
banks are able to structure deposit contracts to  preclude sunspot runs; however, 
individual banks face withdrawal risk because they are not sufficiently diver- 
sified across depositors (perhaps for geographic reasons).  This creates the 
need for a clearinghouse arrangement among banks, under which those banks suf- 
fering heavy withdrawals can borrow from those who do not.  Bhattacharya and 
Gale then show that if it is costly to monitor individual  bank portfolios, banks 
will invest suboptimally in liquid  assets.  The private scheme  encourages banks 
to hold a very illiquid portfolio, and instead rely heavily  on  the clearinghouse 
to meet withdrawal risk.  This occurs because the clearinghouse rate is lower 
than the rate banks can earn on illiquid assets, for insurance purposes.  Since 
all  banks hold too few liquid assets, less than the desired amount of funds are 
available to the clearinghouse to  meet legitimate loan requests.  Shattacharya 
and Gale then show it is optimal for the government to provide subsidized 
liquidity insurance to private banks; the optimal policy is interpretable  either 
as deposit insurance or  subsidized discount window lending. 
Implicit in the Bhattacharya/Gale  paper is the following important point 
Any case for government intervention into particular forms of  intermediation 
probably rests on the absence of  well functioning secondary markets for the 
assets of  the relevant financial institutions.12  Liquidity risk is not a 
problem for banks or  other intermediaries if they can easily obtain funds by 
marketing their assets.  Bhattacharya and Gale proceed by  assuming banks cannot 32 
trade their assets.  But they are not without support: Many recent authors 
(e.g.,  Fama (1985] and Bernanke and Gertler (1987a]) argue that an important 
feature of commercial banks is that a good fraction of the assets they hold are 
information  intensive loans, securities which are nonmarketable due to being 
highly idiosyncratic  and imperfectly collateralized.13  Moreover, it is this 
feature  which may make them candidates for special attention, and not their role 
in money provision —  many other financial institutions  provide transactions and 
liquidity services to depositors, and function perfectly well because they have 
marketable assets.  14 
In this spirit, Bernanke and Gertler (1987a] develop a model of  banking and 
macroeconomic behavior which stresses the role of banks in facilitating credit 
flows.  The analysis first demonstrates how the financial health of  the banking 
sector itself  say be important to the macroeconomy and second discusses how 
monetary policy can matter to  real activity by affecting the flow of bank 
credit. 
In their setting, bank capital plays an important role in securing the 
liabilities  banks issue to depositors.  It is assumed that banks have private 
information  about the returns  to  their portfolio, but that they cannot perfectly 
diversify independent  risks from loan projects, due to spatial considerations 
(in analogy to  Bhattacharya and Gale).  Having larger quantities of  net worth 
permits a bank to Obtain more deposits and,  correspondingly,  to allocate a 
larger  fraction of  its portfolio to risky loans; it provides the bank with sore 
collateral to guarantee its liabilities  and to therefore mitigate the infor- 
mational risk that depositors face.15  Thus, overall, bank net worth positions 
govern the scale of banking and hence the flow of bank credit.  This in turn has 
implications for investment and output. 33 
The framework Bernanke and Gertler develop is essentially a formalized ver- 
sion of an extreme Gurley/Shaw environment.  There exist perfect substitutes for 
bank liabilities, but not for bank assets)6  Using reasoning similar to Blinder 
and Stiglitz (1983),  the authors then demonstrate how monetary policy can matter 
by affecting the availability  of bank credit,  in contrast to the traditional 
Keynesian and Monetarist stories.  This transmission  mechanism arises to the 
extent that,  first, the level  of  bank reserves constrains bank lending and that, 
second the central bank can control the real  quantity of  reserves (e.g.,  due to 
temporary price stickiness).  (See Farmer [19861 for a description of a 
"credit-based" monetary transmission mechanism which relies on  reserve require- 
ments, but not on  price inertia.) 
Whether monetary policy matters by  affecting bank liabilities  or bank assets 
is another issue which deserves further scrutiny.  The empirical evidence thus 
far is mixed.  (See King £1985]  and Bernanke [1985]  for opposing conclusions.) 
Part of  the problem may be  due to the general difficulty of  discerning struc- 
tural relationships  from time series data. 
tI.3  Models of  Business Fluctuations 
Only recently have macroeconomists regained an  interest in exploring issues 
of  financial structure.  Interestingly, this contrasts with many economists in 
the  private sector who have continuously stressed the importance of financial 
variables in output determination.  In the ORI econometric forecasting  model, 
for example, procyclical  movements in balance sheet positions and other related 
constructs feed back into  output behavior.  As  Eckatein and Sinai [1986]  argue, 
this financial mechanism is important for predicting business fluctuations.  The 
current research in this area tries to formalize the types of propagation mecha- 
nisms discussed in Eckstein and Sinai's paper and in the earlier academic 34 
literature,  described previously.  In this regard, it attempts to  provide 
theories emphasizing financial factors  using the same level  of rigor as  real 
business cycle analysis. 
An  early example of  the new approach is Sheinkman and Weiss tl986],  which 
demonstrates how borrowing constraints can increase the variability of consump- 
tion, output and employment.  The paper considers an  environment where two 
representative individuals  face negatively correlated productivity risks.  In a 
frictionless environment, the individuals  can either directly insure these risks 
or accomplish the same through lending and borrowing; in this case,  individual 
risks do  not induce aggregate fluctuations.  In a setting where these markets 
do  not exist, the individuals  must self-insure by adjusting consumption, saving 
and labor supply.  Scheinkman and Weiss demonstrate how this behavior at the 
individual level leads to  cycles in aggregate behavior.17 
Other papers focus on motivating the financial structure endogenously, in 
analogy to the literature discussed in the previous two sections.  Farmer [19841 
presents a model where informational  problems between lenders  and borrowers 
magnify the effects of changes in the riskless interest rate on  output. 
Entrepreneurs privately observe the productivity  and ax post returns of their 
loan projects.  Moreover, they have limited liability, so that the optimal 
financial arrangement  with lenders is a debt contract with a  default option, for 
reasons roughly similar to Townsend's argument.  A change in the riskless rate 
has an enlarged effect on loan  rates - and therefore  on  output — because  it 
alters the default rate.  A subsequent paper, Farmer [1985],  uses similar 
reasoning to suggest why interest rate movements might have magnified effects on 
employment demand and layoff probabilities, to the extent that firms need 
leverage to finance factor  demands. 35 
Related approaches emphasize the role of intermediation.  For example, 
Williamson [19871  incorporates  his model of intermediation and credit rationing 
(described  earlier) into a simple business cycle framework to study the interac- 
tion between financial and real  variables.  Productivity disturbances - in  the 
form of  mean preserving spreads to project returns — change default probabili- 
ties,  thereby affecting the degree of  credit rationing and the levels of invest- 
ment and output. 
Finally, a number of  papers attempt to  explicitly formulate the balance 
sheet and cash flow effects on investment and output fluctuations  described by 
Eckstein and Sinai and earlier by  Fisher, Gurley and Shaw, and others.  Bernanke 
and Gertler [19861  develop a framework in which endogenous procyclical movements 
in entrepreneurial net worth magnify investment  and output fluctuations.  Prior 
to the introduction  of informational  asymmetries, the framework resembles a 
simple real  business cycle model; financial structure is irrelevant.  Adding 
the asymmetries,  however, makes financial arrangements  determinate and also 
makes the borrowers' net worth positions key factors governing their capacity 
to obtain external funds, for reasons  discussed in Section 3.1.  Further, 
Bernanke and Gertler structure the framework so  that movements in output produce 
positively correlated changes in borrower balance sheets.  As  a result, the 
wedge between the Cost of external versus internal  funds moves counter- 
cyclically, thus magnifying swings in investment  and output.  Essentially, 
an income-accelerator  effect on  investment emerges because increases in income 
relax borrowing constraints. 
The paper also provides some formal support for Fisher's debt-deflation 
story.  In the theoretical framework, redistributions between borrowers and len- 
ders matter to  aggregate real  activity.  A transfer from debtors to  creditors - 
due,  for example, to an unanticipated  decline in the price level - weakens 36 
debtors' balance sheets and thus reduces their ability to externally finance 
investments;  because the debtor class includes those most efficient at managing 
investment projects, the redistribution lowers investment and real  activity. 
Greenwald and Stiglitz [1986]  present a related analysis, which illustrates 
the cycliCal implications  of  constraints on  firms'  abilities to issue new 
equity.  They appeal to equity rationing - as described in Greenwald, Stiglitz 
and Weiss [1984]  (see section 11.1)  - to motivate an environment where each 
firm finances labor input exclusively  with debt.  Because default is costly to 
managers (e.g.,  it adversely affects their reputations), a firm's  employment 
demand depends on  how well it can secure its debt, and hence on its equity 
position.  Movements in cash flow affect  employment demand by  altering the 
quantity of  internal funds available.  Also,  wealth redistributions and relative 
price changes affect borrowing constraints and,  in this capacity, can matter to 
aggregate activity. 
One limitation  of  these models — one  that needs to  be overcome before they 
can explicitly confront time series data in the way  real  business cycle 
frameworks do  — is that they typically abstract  from multi—period financial 
arrangements.  This is done to avoid the technical problems inherent in general 
equilibrium  modelling of long term relationships.  An important exception is 
Green [1985].  This paper derives the  optimal contract structure for an economy 
of infinitely lived individuals  who face independent  and privately observed 
income  disturbances.  The informational  problems preclude individuals from per- 
fectly insuring against these risks.  Green proves that under the optimal 
contractual arrangement individuals  can obtain partial insurance by  entering a 
long term borrower/lender relationship  with a diversified intermediary. 
Further, the amount an individual  can borrow  depends on  his net worth position. 
As a result, individuals  spending patterns will depend on the evolution of their 37 
respective net worth positions.  The next level of theoretical development in 
this literature  will, I think,  involve extensions of Green's work. 
Another current limitation is that these frameworks have very ambiguous 
policy  implications.  In analogy to the intermediation literature,  the basic 
issue involves  whether the government can improve  on the types of contractual 
arrangements that would arise in an unfettered private economy.  The results are 
highly sensitive to the postulated information  structure.  (See Townsend [1987] 
for a general discussion of  the sensitive connection between the information 
structure and private equilibrium contractual arrangements.) 
Finally, the analyses are not well integrated with monetary theory.  The 
major obstacle is probably the general difficulty of incorporating  money into 
general equilibrium frameworks.  As  result, it is difficult to sharply evaluate 
the effects of monetary policy.  Townsend [1983]  has made some progress in this 
direction by appealing to inefficiencies in trade resulting from spatial separa- 
tion to  develop a unified treatment of  money, credit, and output growth. 
Understanding the exact link between these phenomena requires further study. 
Concluding Remarks 
Summers [1986]  has recently argued that historical experience suggests 
recessions, and certainly depressions, involve  breakdowns in trade in one form 
or another — and  that any theory of output determination  must ultimately be  able 
to  address this phenomenon.  At the same time,  Prescott [19861 has restated the 
importance of internal  consistency.  The new literature  on  the real/financial 
interaction  proceeds in the spirit of both these arguments. 
At this preliminary stage, it offers rigorous explanations for how inef- 
ficiencies in intertemporal trade may arise.  It suggests how these inefficien- 
cies manifest themselves in the behavior of  financial markets and institutions 38 
and,  mostly importantly,  why they may be significant factors in aggregate econo- 
mic activity.  There are as well a rich set of testable implications  about the 
co-movement  between a broad array of  real and financial variables,  And some 
initial  empirical work has yielded encouraging results (,e.g.,  Fazzari, Hubbard 
and Peterson [1987].) 
A major obstacle remains, nonetheless.  The theoretical models developed 
thus far are highly stylized and capable  of  generating only qualitative predic- 
tions.  Due to  methodological limitations,  there currently does not exist a 
unified framework which can directly confront data, as for example is possible 
with a real  business cycle model.  This tractability problem appears common to 
all  theories that appeal to (rigorously  motivated) market inefficiencies to 
explain aspects of macroeconomic behavior.  It alone, however, is not grounds 
for abandoning the  general approach. 39 
Footnotes 
1This  argument seems even more applicable to the contemporary economy, given 
the rapid pace of financial innovation.  See Hester [1985)  for a recent 
discussion. 
2The literature distinguishes two general types of information problems 
first, adverse selection - where trading parties have asymmetric information 
prior to contracting - and  second, moral hazard - where the asymmetries arise 
after contracting.  See Gale [1987]  for a recent discussion of the behavior of 
markets under adverse selection, and Hart and Holmstrom [1986]  for a treatment 
of moral hazard. 
3The reasoning is similar to Rothschild and Stiglitz's [1976] and Wilson's 
[1977)  description of how adverse selection may disrupt insurance markets. 
4Bester [1985)  argues that banks may be  able to  screen the good borrowers 
through collateral requirements, and thus eliminate the rationing. 
Inefficiencies will remain however, since good borrowers will be  exposing them- 
selves to  greater risk relative to the perfect information  case.  Further, 
Hellwig [1986]  discusses how Bester's Conclusions are very sensitive to the form 
of the game between banks and borrowers. 
5A recent example is Smith [1983],  who embeds the Jaffee/Russell model into 
a simple general equilibrium framework to evaluate the effects of central bank 
discount window policies. 
6The argument assumes that the lender only uses deterministic monitoring 
strategies and that he commits to monitoring in the default state even though it 
may not be in his interest to do  so ax  post.  See Mookherjee and Png [1987)  and 
Townsend [1987)  who  generalize the analysis to allow for  random  monitoring 
schemes.  See Moore [1987)  who relaxes the commitment assumption.  One implica- 
tion of these analyses is that the optimal contract form need not be debt. 40 
In addition, to obtain simple debt contracts as the exclusive financial 
instrument, it is also necessary that the borrower's returns not be  correlated 
with aggregate variables.  Otherwise, the optimal financial contract will 
include  contingencies based on  the movements in these aggregates. 
It should be stressed that these caveats do  not alter the basic point that 
the  informational asymmetries reduce the efficiency of the financial process. 
central feature  of  the Boyd/Prescott analysis is that it uses the theory 
of mechanism design (see,  e.g., Harris and Townsend (1978]  and Townsend (1985]) 
to endogenously motivate intermediation.  Roughly speaking, the optimal inter- 
mediary structure emerges as the institutional  scheme that implements the opti- 
mal allocation resulting from a social  planning problem, which is to  maximize 
welfare subject to the relevant informational  and technological  constraints. 
See also, Haubrich, [1987]. 
8One can't let this statement pass,  I suppose, without wondering for a 
moment about what might have happened to the commercial banking system last 
week, had Glass/Steagall not been in tact. 
9lhis possibility has motivated a number of researchers to study historical 
episodes of free banking.  See Rolnick and Weber  [1984]  for a treatment of the 
U.S. experience. 
10See Bryant (1980]  and Smith [1986]  for related analyses.  In addition, 
Bental, Eckstein and Peled [1987]  study the problem in a international  setting. 
Need1ess  to say, my confidence in arguments that private institutional 
arrangements can avert panics has dwindled a bit, after last week. 
alternative, discussed by  Smith [19841  is that legal  restrictions such 
as interest ceilings may be necessary to ensure that an equilibrium exists in 
the presence of  adverse selection problems. 13Bank  assets I.dhich are securitized and sold on secondary markets are typi- 
cally collaterized relatively well (e.g., car loans and mortgages).  See 
Pennachi [1987] for an  argument why moral hazard problems may inhibit  an  active 
second market for idiosyncratic  and unsecured business loans. 
140ne puzzle left unexplained (in  theory) is why certain financial institu- 
tions combine transactions and lending  services.  One possibility,  suggested by 
Black [1975)  is that banks can better monitor their loan  customers if they are 
as well processing their transactions accounts.  See Fischer [19831  as  well  for 
a discussion of this issue. 
15See also Samolyk [1987],  who analyzes the connection between net worth and 
banks' ability to withstand interest rate risk. 
16See James [1987] and Chirinko and King [1987] for empirical support for 
the view that banks have a special role in the credit supply process. 
17See also Blinder [1986]  who illustrates how borrowing constraints  may 
add to the variability of output, in the context of  an IS/LM model. 42 
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